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For the first time since 2009, enlargement is back on 
the NATO agenda. The process has been fuelled by 
the events in Ukraine and the subsequent strained 
relations between the West and Moscow: Western 
leaders see a need to counter Russia’s attempts at 
‘divide and rule’ policies and solidify the Western 
security anchoring in countries seeking membership 
in the alliance. However, due to various political 
obstacles, in practice there is only one country that 
appears likely to get an invitation to join NATO at the 
upcoming Warsaw Summit in July 2016 – and that is 
Montenegro.
Of all the members of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership 
Council (EAPC), there are some – like Sweden, Fin-
land, Austria and Switzerland – that have remained 
reluctant to join NATO, predominantly for historical 
reasons. Russia’s new and assertive international 
approach has yet to change the mood in these coun-
tries as regards NATO membership, although closer 
partnership ties with Finland and Sweden were 
agreed at the Wales Summit in September 2014. 
Another reluctant country is Serbia, which has been 
trying to balance its foreign policy between the West 
and Russia. It relies on Russian support in the UN 
Security Council to prevent Kosovo from becoming 
a UN-recognized state, and has certain historical 
bonds with Moscow. Serbia’s NATO-scepticism stems 
mainly from the 1999 bombing, but Yugoslavia’s 
Cold War non-alignment identity hold some attrac-
tion in today’s Serbia as well. Nonetheless, in Janu-
ary 2015 it signed an Individual Partnership Action 
Plan (IPAP) with NATO, which in practical terms 
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1 The official Greek position on the dispute can be found here: http://www.
mfa.gr/en/fyrom-name-issue/
means that defence sector reforms being carried out 
in accordance with NATO standards. The joint visit of 
the Serbian ministers of defence and foreign affairs 
to NATO in March 2015 is also a clear political sig-
nal of priorities. Serbia is a strong supporter of KFOR 
in Kosovo, and is planning numerous military joint 
exercises with NATO countries this year. Serbian mili-
tary cooperation with Russia has been minuscule, by 
comparison.
Then there are four countries currently seeking 
NATO membership: Bosnia-Hercegovina, Georgia, 
Macedonia, and Montenegro. Both Georgia and Mac-
edonia are considered more or less ‘ready’ in terms 
of implemented security sector reforms, democratic 
oversight, rule of law (RoL) etc. However, given the 
current geo-political climate and Georgia’s unsettled 
relationship with Russia regarding the two breakaway 
regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the West is not 
particularly eager to invite Georgia into the Alliance. 
Macedonia has remained blocked by Greece due to 
its peculiar objection to the constitutional name, 
‘Macedonia’, claiming that Macedonia have ‘irreden-
tist and territorial ambitions’.1 As a result of stalled 
integration into NATO and EU, democratization and 
reform have been slipping back in Macedonia, as 
shown by recent political scandals, demonstrations 
and violence. Although NATO membership could 
offer a pillar of internal and regional stabilization for 
Macedonia, no invitation will be forthcoming as long 
as Greece objects to it.  
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Bosnia-Hercegovina has a standing invitation 
to get Membership Action Plan (MAP) status, on 
the condition that 63 defence properties in the 
country are registered as state property, for use by 
the country’s defence ministry. However, Bosnia-
Hercegovina is torn internally between the entities 
of the Federation and Republika Srpska (RS), with 
the latter predominantly negative towards NATO. 
RS is also reluctant to transfer ownership of its 
military properties to Bosniak-dominated Sara-
jevo, although some progress has been achieved 
lately. Fear and distrust between ethnic groups still 
overshadow the future, 20 years after the end of 
the war. Russia has increasingly supported the RS 
position in Bosnia’s Peace Implementation Council 
in recent months, making reforms even harder to 
achieve.
That leaves Montenegro. The tiny Adriatic state 
will hardly strengthen NATOs military capacities, 
but it has had MAP-status since 2009 – and peace 
and stability in the Western Balkans are of crucial 
importance for Europe. Furthermore, from the 
perspective of Montenegro and the region in gen-
eral, NATO membership does count. Neighbouring 
Croatia and Albania are already members, whereas 
other neighbours, as noted above, remain in a 
somewhat shaky security situation. In addition, 
economic challenges, unemployment, corruption, 
social inequality, pressure on the media and con-
tinued ethnic tensions still threaten to undermine 
democratic reforms and stability in the region. 
And finally, Russian influence appears to be on the 
rise, aimed at filling any political vacuum left open 
by the West. In this context, a NATO invitation 
to Montenegro would be a stabilizing factor and 
demonstrate that hard work and reform eventually 
pay off. The Montenegrin authorities hope to get 
such an invitation at the North Atlantic Council in 
December this year. 
 
Montenegro had been hoping for an invitation 
already at the Wales Summit, but got instead this 
promise: ‘In recognition of Montenegro’s progress 
towards NATO membership, the Alliance has 
agreed to open intensified and focused talks with 
Montenegro, and agreed that Foreign Ministers 
will assess Montenegro’s progress no later than by 
the end of 2015 with a view to deciding on whether 
to invite Montenegro to join the Alliance.’2 Since 
then, the Montenegrin authorities have been work-
ing intensively to deal with all remaining short-
comings, on numerous levels.
On the practical level, the NATO integration proc-
ess for countries with MAP status is primarily con-
ducted through the Annual National Programmes 
(ANP): annual strategies with clear objectives 
and milestones in several sectors, defined by the 
candidate country itself in cooperation with NATO. 
Montenegro is currently working on the basis of its 
fifth ANP, presented in Brussels in October 2014. 
It focuses on four sectors: security sector reform, 
strengthening RoL, increasing public support 
for accession to NATO, and continuation of the 
defence sector reform. The RoL requirements go far 
beyond the defence sector, and concern issues like 
corruption, organized crime, money laundering 
and trafficking. This part of the process is closely 
associated with Montenegro’s on-going EU nego-
tiations in Chapters 23 (Judiciary and fundamen-
tal rights) and 24 (Justice, freedom and security). 
NATO is likely to look to the EU for assessments 
of progress here; in addition, the USA has bilater-
ally demanded concrete steps to be prioritized and 
implemented, including anti-corruption measures 
and intelligence reform. 
Among Montenegro’s main internal challenges is 
the muted public support for NATO membership. 
The population is split: one third in favour, one 
third against and one third undecided, with the 
battle primarily over the latter third. Those who are 
opposed to NATO membership tend to be people 
who identify themselves as Serbs, and those with 
particular negative experience of the 1999 NATO 
bombing which also hit Montenegro, albeit in a 
limited way. But no realistic alternative to NATO 
is on the agenda, and according to some polls a 
majority of the population believe that the country 
will eventually join NATO, irrespective of their per-
sonal views. The authorities have aimed at getting 
more than 50% support for membership, but this 
has proven difficult. The latest polls show about 
40%, despite massive campaigning. NGOs have 
criticized the authorities for conducting a boring 
and unengaging campaign.3 NATO Secretary-Gen-
eral Stoltenberg recently expressed ‘regrets’ over 
the loss of innocent lives in Montenegro during the 
1999 NATO air campaign, a statement probably 
aimed at assisting the authorities in persuading 
the public.4 That being said, should the authorities 
fail in these efforts, NATO countries that are cur-
rently reluctant to enlargement may become even 
more sceptical. 
2 Paragraph 95 in the Wales Summit Declaration: http://www.nato.int/
cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
3 ‘Raonić: Kampanja za članstvo u NATO pomalo dosadna’, Analitika, 
28 March 2015: http://portalanalitika.me/clanak/181453/raonic-
kampanja-za-clanstvo-u-nato-pomalo-dosadna
4 ‘NATO Chief “Sincerely Regrets Civilian Deaths” in 1999 Bombing’, 
Balkan Insight, 15 June 2015: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/ar-
ticle/nato-chief-sincerely-regrets-civilian-deaths-in-1999-bombing-1 
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At the end of the day however, the decision to invite 
Montenegro or not is a political one. The formal 
requirements are tougher than in previous rounds, 
but there are no formal lists of targets or criteria to 
be fulfilled – nor is there any automatic invitation 
if certain measures are implemented. Most observ-
ers regard the Montenegrin defence sector as being 
‘sufficiently’ reformed to be approved for mem-
bership, although continued efforts are needed – 
indeed, as in NATO itself. Within the Alliance it is 
particularly the neighbouring countries that have 
been promoting Montenegro’s candidacy. Also 
Serbia is said to be positive. As usual, it is France 
that has expressed greatest scepticism towards 
enlargement,5  while the USA, the UK and Germany 
now appear supportive of Montenegro’s bid. The 
remainder of the 28 NATO countries have a more 
passive stance, but some seem to express certain 
concerns regarding Montenegro’s RoL status. 
However, the fact that Montenegro (in contrast 
to, for instance, Serbia) has signed up to the EU 
sanctions against Russia certainly also weighs in 
positively in most Western capitals – in Washing-
ton DC in particular. Given the significant Russian 
investments in Montenegrin coastal properties, the 
sanctions may prove costly for Montenegro’s cru-
cial tourism industry this season. These Russian 
investments are generally not applauded in Mon-
tenegro, as they tend to be associated with money 
laundering and have contributed only modestly to 
the modernization of the industry itself. There are 
also rumours that Russian money is financing the 
two anti-NATO campaigns in Montenegro and that 
they are involved in a recent bizarre claim from 
neighbouring Bosnia to a part of the Montenegrin 
coastline.6 It has also been claimed that events 
at the recent scandalous football match between 
Montenegro and Russia, adjourned due to the 
anti-Russian behaviour of Montenegrin fans, were 
staged by the secret service in Montenegro. Such 
conspiracy theories are typical of the region, but 
there can be little doubt that there is indeed a par-
allel struggle over NATO taking place behind the 
scenes. 
Another challenge for Montenegro is its limited 
achievements as regards democracy. Several inde-
pendent institutions have been established and 
strengthened in recent decades, but the politi-
cal and economic elite have remained the same 
for the past 20 years. Prime Minster Djukanovic, 
often called the ‘political survivor of the Western 
Balkans’, is controversial internally and interna-
tionally for his alleged links to organized crime. 
Irrespective of the truth of such accusations, the 
fact that the same people have governed the coun-
try for so long is an unhealthy sign in any aspir-
ing democracy. The Western strategy has been to 
induce change and reforms through the EU and 
NATO integration processes, hoping that democ-
racy will emerge bottom–up. To date this has 
proven rather successful, although the uppermost 
echelons of power have stayed unchanged. 
It seems that Djukanovic is assisted by the erratic 
behaviour of Putin, which is making it geo-polit-
ically more important to enlarge and strengthen 
NATO to face up to Russia than to putting contin-
ued pressure on reform in Montenegro. As one US 
diplomat put it: before Ukraine we were asking: 
why enlargement? Now we ask: why not? Further-
more, the recent events in Macedonia demonstrate 
how dangerous a stalled integration and reform 
process could be, and also how Russia may seek to 
exploit this to its own ends.7 Still, one cannot rule 
out that an invitation to Montenegro from North 
Atlantic Council in December will be conditional 
on continued reforms before the Warsaw Summit 
in July 2016.8 It remains up to each and every 
one of NATO’s 28 members to support an invita-
tion. But unless the Montenegrin government 
completely fails to swing the domestic mood, or 
fails to convince NATO that is has delivered on its 
reforms, Montenegro is more likely than not to be 
invited to join NATO at the upcoming Summit. 
Irrespective of the exact timing, eventual NATO 
enlargement to MAP countries is a positive devel-
opment and a stabilizing factor in Europe. Keep-
ing up the momentum of reform is crucial in this 
respect, as NATO (and EU) membership after all not 
only is a goal in itself but also a means to achieve 
democratic and stable societies. Both NATO and 
the leaders of the aspiring countries should work 
hard to make sure it will not be another six years 
before the next round of enlargement.
5 See “Hollande Statement On Halting NATO Enlargement Under 
Scrutiny”, RFL, 4 March 2015: http://www.rferl.org/content/nato-
hollande-statement-enlargement-georgia-montenegro/26882183.
html
6 See ‘Montenegro PM: Bosnia Claim to Coast Destructive’, Balkan In-
sight, 28 January 2015: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/
montenegro-s-pm-slates-bosnia-over-teritorial-claim 
7 See ‘Macedonia Becomes Latest Stage for Russian Tensions With 
the West’, Wall Street Journal, 2 June 2015: http://www.wsj.com/ar-
ticles/macedonia-becomes-latest-stage-for-russian-tensions-with-
the-west-1433202972
8 According to the Montenegrin newspaper Vijesti, this is a rumour 
in diplomatic circles: http://www.vijesti.me/vijesti/stoltenberg-
nismo-vas-pozvali-iz-velsa-zbog-nedovoljne-borbe-protiv-korupci-
je-837797
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